Functionalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Aug 24, 2004 · Functionalists hold that mental states are to be characterized in terms of their roles in a psychological theory – be it common sense, scientific, or something in between – but all such …
Functionalism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aug 24, 2004 · Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it …
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Jan 12, 2000 · Like Lewis and Armstrong, functionalists define mental states and processes in terms of their causal relations to behaviour but stop short of identifying them with their neural realisations.
Inverted Qualia - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Nov 10, 2004 · The functional roles I am talking about are what I call ‘long-arm’ roles, roles that include real things in the world as the inputs and outputs. They are to be distinguished from the ‘short-arm’ …
Multiple Realizability - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Nov 23, 1998 · Polger and Shapiro begin by focusing on the key contention that functionalists and “realization physicalists” have emphasized to support their views over identity theories.
Indicative Conditionals - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aug 8, 2001 · This dispute need not concern us, as the arguments which follow depend only on the feature on which non-truth-functionalists agree: that when [Math Processing Error] is false, “If [Math …
Eliminative Materialism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
May 8, 2003 · As functionalists have claimed, these causal roles appear to define our ordinary notion of belief and distinguish them from other types of mental states. Second, beliefs have intentionality; that …
The Computational Theory of Mind (Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Oct 16, 2015 · In response to this objection, machine functionalists might deny that they are obligated to explain systematicity. Nevertheless, the objection suggests that machine functionalism neglects …
Philosophy of Linguistics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Sep 21, 2011 · Paradigmatic functionalists like Tomlin, Van Valin and MacWhinney could in principle hold that the explanation of syntactic form, for example, will ultimately be in terms of discourse …
Preferences (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Oct 4, 2006 · Functionalists’ accounts of preferences deny such an intrinsically mental interpretation of preferences, without reducing them to behaviour. In functionalism, the nature of preferences, like that …